I study a model of multiple currencies in which sellers can choose the currency they will accept. I provide conditions that are necessary and sufficient to avoid indeterminacy of the exchange rate. Under these assumptions, all stable equilibria have the property that all sellers in the same country accept the same currency. Thus stable equilibria are either single currency or national currencies equilibria. I also show that currency substitution occurs as an endogenous response to high growth in the stock of a currency.
Introduction
Starting with the work of Stockman (1980) , Helpman (1981) , and Lucas (1982) , model economies with multiple currencies often impose cash-in-advance constraints. More precisely, it is usually taken as given that purchases of goods produced in a foreign country must be made with the currency accepted in that country, and the currency that is accepted in a particular country is itself taken as given. In this paper, I provide conditions under which these features can arise endogenously and show that currency substitution occurs when the stock of a currency grows at a sufficiently high rate.
Because I do not impose the currency that sellers accept, I have to face the problem of indeterminacy of the exchange rate, first noted by Kareken and Wallace (1981) . I provide necessary and sufficient conditions that eliminate the indeterminacy. I impose a cost of accepting more than one type of currency, as well as a foreign exchange transactions cost.
The exchange rate indeterminacy disappears if the cost of accepting more than one currency is high enough so that no household ever chooses to pay it.
Under these assumptions, I show that stable equilibria have the property that all sellers in the same country will accept the same currency. This currency might be the same as the currency accepted by sellers in the other country (single currency equilibrium) or it might be different (national currencies equilibrium).
The intuition for these results is that the assumed costs create a network externality: Sellers choose to accept the currency that generates the least transaction costs and the size of these costs depends on the fraction of sellers that accept each of the currencies. In a national currencies equilibrium, sellers find it cheaper to accept the same currency as the other sellers in their country, rather that accepting the currency of the foreign country, because they spend more on the goods sold by the former than the latter.
I also show that, if the stock of a currency grows too fast, a national currencies equilibrium might fail to exist. Under such an equilibrium, an increase in the rate of growth of currency i means that households in country i receive more of that currency as it is newly issued. In other words, the amount of currency i they need to obtain by selling goods diminishes. If it can accept only one type of currency while others may choose which one they accept. Fisher (1999) builds a multiple-currency model that is based on the cash-and-credit framework developed by Schreft (1992) . In all of these cases, cash-in-advance constraints are assumed and thus the existence of a national currencies equilibrium is assumed rather that derived.
More recently, many authors have studied multiple currencies in the context of search models of money. See for example Camera, Craig and Waller (2001) , Kocherlakota and Krueger (1999) , Matsuyama, Kiyotaki and Matsui (1993) , Soller Curtis and Waller (2000), Ravikumar and Wallace (2001) , Wright (1996 and , Zhou (1997) . There has been a lot of work on currency substitution, a survey of which can be found in Giovannini and Turtelboom (1994) . Recent work includes Chang (1994) , Siebert and Liu (1998), Sturzenegger (1997) , Tandon and Wang (1999) , Uribe (1997) .
In section 2, I study a simple model with only one country and two currencies. In section 3, I look at a two countries model and show that national currencies equilibria exist. In section 4, I prove that fast money growth can lead to currency substitution. Section 5 concludes.
A simple model with two currencies
First I consider a simple model and provide necessary and sufficient conditions that eliminate the indeterminacy of the exchange rate. At each date t, t ≥ 0, a continuum of identical households resides at each location on a circle with circumference of one. Each household in location z, z ∈ [0, 1], is endowed in every period with ω > 0 units of a non-storable, locationspecific good. At date t = 0, the households hold equal shares of the units of fiat currency outstanding. There are two fiat currencies and the stock of currency i at date t is denoted by
It is assumed that an household's preferences at each date can be represented by a period utility function U (W (c tz )). The argument c tz is a vector with typical element being consumption of good z, z ∈ [0, 1], at date t. Assume that U is twice differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave. For tractability, I assume that consumption goods available at the same date are perfect complements. Thus, W (c tz ) = inf z {c tz }. Without loss of generality, the utility-maximizing bundle is taken to be c tz = c t for all z. Thus, the period utility function may be written as U (c t ), and the representative household's objective is to maximize
The money supply for each currency evolves according to
Money is distributed equally to each household by means of helicopter drops. In this paper I do not want to assume any preferences for the authority that manages the money supply. I will just consider different levels of π i and their implications.
Note that there is a perfectly competitive goods market and securities market at each point of the circle. It is convenient to think of each household as consisting of a seller and a shopper.
The seller stays home and sells the consumption good, while the shopper travels completely around the circle, buying goods at each point. I impose a cash-in-advance constraint so the the shopper must use cash for all purchases. However, I let the sellers choose which currency they will accept 1 .
The timing, in each period, is as follows: First, households repay outstanding debts.
Next sellers decide which currency they will accept and then currency exchange takes place. So far, I have assumed that it is costless for a seller to accept more than one currency. If all sellers accept both currencies, the households' problem can be written as:
where θ denotes the fraction of transactions for which the household used currency 1 (currency 2 being used for all other transactions) andθ denotes the fraction of transactions for which this household accepted currency 1.
All constraints are written in terms of currency 1. The first equation states that wealth at the end of the securities trading session, holdings of cash and securities, denominated in each currency, cannot exceed beginning of period wealth. Beginning of period wealth is composed of cash held over from last period, securities bought last period, and injections of new currency. The second equation is an identity that defines end-of-period cash holdings.
The third equation is the cash-in-advance constraint. The last three equations are a nonnegativity constraint and transversality conditions. The cash-in-advance constraint and the end-of-period-cash equation can be written as they are because it is costless for sellers to accept more that one currency and for households to change their currency-portfolio allocation.
Hence households only care about the total value of their cash holdings, rather than the holdings in each currency
Equilibrium
A steady state equilibrium is a set of constants c, m i , m i , b i , r i , i = 1, 2, and a value of p t , q t and e t for each t ≥ 0 for which, given ω, M 10 , M 20 , π 1 and π 2 , (i) households solve the problem described above;
(ii) The money supply for each currency evolves according to: An equilibrium with valued fiat money exists since this is an endowment economy with a representative household. In equilibrium, the nominal exchange rate e t satisfies p t = e t q t .
For the rest of the paper I assume that all sellers at one location accept the same currency. Thus, θ denotes the fraction of locations that accepts currency 1. While this saves on notation, I will show that it is without loss of generality. An alternative, and notationally more demanding, specification would be to have a local monopoly at each point of the circle and assume that agents have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. The result in this paper would hold for this alternative model. The proof of this classic result is omitted. It was first obtained by Kareken and Wallace (1981) .
Indeterminacy of the exchange rate
In order to make the sellers decision about which currency to accept interesting, I not impose conditions that eliminate this indeterminacy. I will show that they are necessary and sufficient. The cost κ must be paid every period. One can think of it as the administrative cost of having to deal with a more complicated accounting system. The decision of which currency to accept is taken every period, and the cost κ is paid in every period the seller decides to accept two currencies. The cost ε can be thought of as a cost of operating the foreign exchange market that must be paid with every transaction. Assumption 3 guarantees that it is always cheaper to pay the cost of foreign exchange than to pay κ and accept both currencies. To obtain the inequality in assumption 3, notice that a household will have to pay ε(1 − θ)c t in foreign exchange costs if its seller accepts currency 1 and εθc t if it accepts currency 2.
It always chooses the cheapest option. Hence, the most the household might have to pay corresponds to the case when these costs are exactly equal. This occurs when θ = .5 and the cost is εc t N 2
. In equilibrium, c t is equal to the endowment, ω, minus the amount of resources used to pay for foreign exchange costs. Thus,
. This implies that
Provided that assumption 3 holds, both costs can be arbitrarily small, as long as they are strictly positive. Proof. For a given value of θ, this is just a cash-in-advance economy for which an equilibrium exists. I now show which values of θ are consistent with sellers minimizing the foreign exchange costs of their household.
Given assumptions 1 and 2, assumption 3 guarantees that sellers will accept only one currency because it is always cheaper to pay the foreign exchange cost than to accept two currencies. I now show that θ taking values of 0, 0.5, or 1 is a necessary condition for an equilibrium. Since foreign exchange transactions are costly, households will choose which currency to accept in order to minimize that cost. Consider a household faced with θ ∈ [0, 0.5).
It will choose to accept currency 2 because it makes more purchases with currency 2 than with currency 1 and thus it will need to exchange a smaller amount of currency. Since this is true of every household, θ must be equal to zero. Conversely, a household faced with θ ∈ (0.5, 1] will choose to accept currency 1, and since this is true for every household, θ must be equal to 1. Finally, a household faced with θ = 0.5 is exactly indifferent between choosing currency 1 or 2 because it makes exactly the same amount of purchases with each currency.
Since equilibria exist only for θ = 0, θ = 0.5, or θ = 1, assumptions 1-3 are sufficient to prevent exchange rate indeterminacy. Now I need to show that assumptions 1-3 are also necessary. If assumption 1 is violated, all sellers accept two currencies and no foreign exchange transaction takes place. Thus, this is similar to the case considered by Kareken and Wallace (1981) and by proposition 2.1, the equilibrium exchange rate is indeterminate. If assumption 2 is violated, the equilibrium exchange rate is uniquely determined by the value of θ. For each θ, this is similar to the "portfolio autarky" case in Kareken and Wallace (1981) , as p t and q t are determined by p t θω = M 1t and q t (1 − θ) ω = M 2t . Also, in equilibrium, p t = e t q t .
However, the value of θ is not determined in equilibrium.
Now assume that assumptions 1 and 2 hold, but not assumption 3. There are equilibria such that some sellers accept both currencies. Let η denote the mass of sellers accepting currency 2. Since θ denotes the mass of sellers accepting currency 1, the remainder (1 − θ − η) accepts both currencies. In order to minimize their foreign exchange transactions costs, households accepting currency 1 will pay the sellers who accept both currencies with currency 1, and households accepting currency 2 will pay the sellers who accept both currencies with currency 2. In equilibrium, each type of household must have the same costs which implies that εθω = κ = εηω, and θ = η. King, Wallace and Weber (1992) have studied such economies and proved that the equilibrium exchange rate is indeterminate (a consequence of their proposition 1).
The two currencies will be valued only if exactly half of the sellers accept currency 1 and half the sellers accept currency 2. Otherwise, only one currency will be valued and all sellers will accept that currency. Note that, everything else being equal, welfare is lower in the mixed currency equilibrium because, each period, goods are being wasted, paying for the transaction cost.
In figure 1 , the three equilibria of proposition 2.2 are labelled E 1 , E 2 , and E 3 , respectively. I want to introduce a notion of stability for the equilibria I consider. An equilibrium is unstable if it is not robust to arbitrarily small changes in households beliefs. Proof. As I pointed out in the proof of proposition 2.2, ifθ ∈ [0, 0.5), then θ = 0 is the equilibrium. Ifθ ∈ (0.5, 1], then θ = 1 is the equilibrium. This shows that both θ = 0 and θ = 1 are stable. It also implies that θ = 0.5 is unstable since the only value ofθ for which it is an equilibrium isθ = 0.5
In this section, I showed that one can eliminate exchange rate indeterminacy if foreign exchange transactions are costly (no matter how small the cost) and if accepting more than one currency is sufficiently costly. In this simple model there is no obvious way of thinking about different countries. All households have the same preferences, and consume the same quantities of the same goods. It might not be so surprising then that in the stable equilibria only one currency is valued.
In the next section, I allow consumers to have different preferences. To make this clear, I assume that there are two circles, representing two countries. All households living in the same country have the same preferences, but they can have different preferences than the households in the other country. I show that this is enough to have two valued currencies.
Two countries and two currencies
I consider an economy similar to the one of the previous section, but with two countries (represented by two different circles). I prove the existence of a "national currencies" equilibrium, and derives some results about currency substitution. Each circle is as described above. I will use x tz (y tz ) to denote the goods available on the first (second) circle in period t and location z. The endowment of these goods are denoted by ω x and ω y , respectively. I assume that there are no markets where households can trade claims on their endowment good.
Preferences of the households in each country can be represented by a utility function, U (x t , y t ; γ 1 ) in country 1 and V (x t , y t ; γ 2 ) in country 2, with γ 1 , γ 2 ∈ [0, 1]. I assume that these functions have the following properties: The law of motion for the money supply and the market clearing conditions for the money market and the foreign exchange market are the same as in section 2. Throughout this section I will maintain the assumption that foreign exchange transactions are costly. I assume that both sides to a foreign exchange transaction pay the cost, and that they pay this cost in their endowment goods. The costs need not be the same for households in country 1 and country 2. Let ε 1 denote the cost paid by households in country 1 in terms of good x, and ε 2 denote the cost paid by households in country 2 in terms of good y. Let p jt and q jt denote the price of good j in terms of currency 1 and 2, respectively, j = x, y. Let θ i denote the proportion of sellers accepting currency 1 in country i, i = 1, 2. Also, as indicated above, m j it denotes the holdings of currency i by a household whose seller accepts currency j at the close of the date t securities market and m j it denotes the holding of currency i by a household whose seller accepts currency j at the close of the date t goods market, i, j = 1, 2. I use a superscript * to denote variables pertaining to country 2. The condition for the goods markets to clear are
I can now write the problem of a household. There are 4 different types of households since, in each country, a household has the choice of accepting either currency 1 or currency 2. The problem below is for a household in country 1 that accepts currency 1.
These constraint have the same interpretation as the constraints in section 2. There are now two equations defining end-of-period cash holdings, and two cash-in-advance constraints, one for each currency. The problems of the other households are analogous.
From the first order conditions with respect to b 1t and b 2t , one gets
so uncovered interest parity holds because the frictions introduced in the model do not affect securities. Also, the ratio of marginal utilities, for each type of household, is
if they accept currency 1, and
, if they accept currency 2.
As will become clear below, the nominal amount spent by households on goods x and y plays a central role in the analysis. Consequently, assuming, as I will in the remainder of the section, that households have Cobb-Douglas preferences greatly simplifies the exposition. In that case, the relative amount spent can be read directly from the above first order conditions. Also, as I show below, the logic of all the proofs applies to more general specifications.
Preferences of households living in country 1 will be represented by ln(x t ) + (1 − γ 1 )ln(y t ), while those living in country 2 have utility functions
In this two country economy, assumption 3 is still sufficient, but might no longer be necessary. A household in country 1 will have to pay ε 1 1 pxt 
This is an approximation, because of the distortion that ε 1 introduces. Because ε 1 and ε 2 are very small, I can ignore them for these calculations.
Consequently, the two costs above can be written as ε 1 [(1 − θ 1 ) + (1 − γ 1 )(1 − θ 2 )] x t and ε 1 [θ 1 + (1 − γ 1 )θ 2 ] x t , respectively. The household will choose the cheapest of the two options, so the foreign exchange cost will be highest when the two costs are exactly equal. This will be the case if (1 − 2θ 1 ) + (1 − γ 1 )(1 − 2θ 2 ) = 0. It is easy to verify that for any combination of θ 1 and θ 2 that satisfy this relationship, the cost of foreign exchange will be ε 1 2−γ 1 2
Following the same steps as in section 2, the maximum transaction cost for households in country 1 can be found to be equal to 1 + 2−γ 1 2 ε 1 −1 ω x . Similar calculations imply that the maximum transaction cost for households in country 2 will be 1 +
The cost of accepting two currencies need not be equal in both countries. Let κ 1 and κ 2 denote this cost in country 1 and 2, respectively. Now I can rewrite assumption 3 for this economy.
Assumption 3'. κ 1 > ε 1 1 + The proof of this proposition is omitted, as it is essentially identical to part of the proof of proposition 2.2.
Now that there are two countries, I also need to change the definition of equilibrium stability. As above, letθ 1 andθ 2 denote the common belief of households about the realized value of θ 1 and θ 2 , respectively.
Now I can determine which values of θ 1 and θ 2 constitute an equilibrium. I consider here the case where the stock of both currencies is constant, and leave the study of the effect of growth in the stock of currencies for the next subsection. There are no transactions cost with a single currency, so θ 1 = θ 2 = 0, and θ 1 = θ 2 = 1 are equilibria.
Since θ 1 , θ 2 ≤ 0, households spend at least as much on the home country good as they will on the foreign country good. This means that it is an equilibrium for all domestic sellers to accept the same currency, even if all foreign seller accept another currency. Thus candidate equilibria 3 and 7 are in fact equilibria.
If half of the households in both countries accept currency 1, and the other half accepts currency 2, then all households are indifferent between the two currencies, and candidate equilibrium 5 is an equilibrium.
Suppose θ 1 = 0 (all households in country 1 accept currency 2), then the foreign exchange cost of accepting currency 1 in country 2 is
while the foreign exchange cost of accepting currency 2 in that country is
Households in country 2 are indifferent between the two currencies if these two quantities are equal. Given the Cobb-Douglas utility functions,
The approximations come from the fact that although ε 1 and ε 2 are very small, they are strictly positive. It is easy to show that the two costs are equal if
Thus candidate equilibrium 2 is an equilibrium. Following the same steps, one can easily show that candidate equilibria 4, 6, and 8 are equilibria as well. Now I show which equilibria are stable. To see that equilibria 1 and 9 are stable, simply consider {θ 1 ,θ 2 } = {.1, .1} and {θ 1 ,θ 2 } = {.9, .9}. In the former case, all sellers strictly prefer to accept currency 2; in the latter they strictly prefer to accept currency 1.
} proves that it is stable. Indeed,
, households in country 1 strictly prefer currency 2, while since 1 − The intuition is that sellers try to minimize the cost of foreign exchange for their household.
With positive home country biases, households spend more on the home good than on the foreign good, so they will tend to accept the same currency as the other households in the same country. A network externality is created by the costs I have assumed. From the perspective of a given household, these costs create a wedge between the prices paid in each currency.
The size of this wedge turns out to be a function of how many sellers accept one currency or the other.
Some of these equilibria can be Pareto ranked because they imply different amounts of goods wasted in transaction costs. Single currency equilibria imply no transaction cost and thus provide the highest welfare, while equilibrium 5 gives rise to the highest transaction costs.
All the equilibria are represented in figure 2 and are denoted by E 1 to E 9 to correspond with proposition 3.3. The lines labelled C 1 and C 2 are given by,
respectively. The slope of these lines are determined by γ 1 and γ 2 , respectively. Consider C 1 . If γ 1 = 0, households in country 1 spend the same value on good x as they do on good y. Thus, if θ 1 increases, θ 2 has to decrease by the same amount for these households to be indifferent between the two currencies. Thus the slope of C 1 will be equal to -1. Suppose now that γ 1 = 1. Then households in country 1 don't buy good y, and thus θ 2 has no influence on their preference for one or the other currency. In that case, C 1 will be vertical. In general, C 1 gets steeper as γ 1 increases. A similar argument show that C 2 has slope -1 if γ 2 = 0, gets flatter as γ 2 increases and become horizontal when γ 2 = 1. Points lower and to the left of C i are such that households in country i strictly prefer currency 2, while points higher and to the right of C i are such that households in country i strictly prefer currency 1, i = 1, 2.
Having a home country bias is important for the stability of the national currencies equilibrium. If, for example, γ 1 = 0, then equilibria 4 and 7 are identical, and so are equilibria 3 and 6. These equilibria are not stable. In that case, the only stable equilibria have a single If should be clear from figure 2 that a result equivalent to proposition 3.3 would hold for more general preferences. Although they would be more difficult to characterize, curves similar to C 1 and C 2 will exists for general utility functions, and their slopes will depend on the γ's. Depending on where these indifference lines lay, not all nine equilibria will exist.
However, it is possible to show that if γ 1 and γ 2 are close to 1, they will. If γ 1 and γ 2 are close to 1 all nine equilibria described in proposition 3.3 exist.
Proof. If γ 1 = γ 2 = 1, both countries are in autarky and, from proposition 2.2, there are three equilibria for each country. Combining these yields the nine equilibria of proposition 3.3. By continuity, these equilibria exist if γ 1 and γ 2 are close to 1.
In this theory, the choice of currency depends on the relative amounts spent on different types of goods. This can help us think of what happens in the case of two countries of different sizes. It is expected that, on average, the fraction of a household's spending on goods from a large country will be big, compared to the fraction spent on goods from a small country.
In order for a national currencies equilibrium to exist, the home country bias in the small country will have to be large. If it is too small, only single currencies equilibria will exist.
Starting from a national currencies equilibrium, as the small country becomes more open to trade, the sellers in that country might decide to adopt the currency of the big country.
In this section, I look at the effect of money growth on the equilibria described above. I will pay particular attention to currency substitution. By currency substitution, I mean the switch from a national currencies to a single currency equilibrium 2 .
Recall that currency i is issued by country i, i = 1, 2, and that there is no market on which households can trade claims on newly issued currency. The effect of growth in the stock of a currency is to decrease the incentive to hold that currency for households that live in the country where the currency is issued. Note that there is no real transfer associated with currency growth because prices move to offset any nominal changes. What is happening, instead, is that households get their cash from a different source. If there is no money growth, households get all their cash from sales, whereas with money growth, part of their cash is newly issued currency. This, in turns, changes the amount households must spend on foreign exchange cost in order to obtain their preferred portfolio. For example, consider a national currencies equilibrium. An increase in π 1 increases the share of currency 1 that households in country 1 receive from the monetary authority, and reduces the share they obtain through sales. As they rely less on their sales to obtain currency 1, the incentive for sellers to accept currency 1 diminishes making currency 2 becomes more attractive. Households in country 2 are completely unaffected by this change.
Graphically, this means that an increase in π 1 shifts the line C 1 to the right, as shown in figure 3 , while an increase in π 2 shifts the line C 2 to the left. To get some intuition, consider equilibrium of type 4. In such an equilibrium, households in country 1 are indifferent between accepting currency 1 and currency 2. If π 1 increases, households in country 1 are no longer indifferent between the two currencies, because they now receive an extra amount of currency 1. Hence they all prefer currency 2. Only if θ 1 increases, will households again be indifferent between the currencies.
As π 1 increases, the line C 1 moves to the right, say to C 1 . If it increases further, there will come a point where equilibria 4 and 7 coincide. For any increase in π 1 above that level, equilibrium 7, the national currencies equilibrium, will fail to exist, as is the case for C 1 . If π 2 increases too much, the line C 2 will move to the left. For high enough π 2 , equilibrium 7 will fail to exist. The following proposition gives the precise bounds that trigger currency substitution. 
, then the national currencies equilibrium fails to exists.
Proof. Assume θ 1 = 1 and θ 2 = 0. In country 1, the foreign exchange cost of accepting currency 1 is e t q yt y t and the cost of accepting currency 2 is p xt x t − (π 1 − 1)M 1t . From proposition 3.3, we know that if π 1 = 1, then p xt x t − (π 1 − 1)M 1t > e t q yt y t . However, there is a value of π 1 high enough that this inequality will be reversed. In that case, households in country 1 will prefer currency 2, and the assumed equilibrium will fail to exist. Again, using the fact that preferences are Cobb-Douglas, it is easily seen that this will happen if (π 1 − 1)M 1t > γ 1 p xt x t . Similar steps will establish that if (π 2 − 1)M 2t > γ 2 p yt y * t , households in country 2 will prefer currency 1. To complete the proof, note that ω Proof. Consider a household in country 1. As π 1 increases, the cost to this households of accepting currency 1 is unchanged. However, the cost of accepting currency 2 is reduced as it now receives some currency 1 through the monetary authority. This means that C 1 has moved to the right. As π 1 increases, the newly issued currency 1 represents a higher fraction of currency 1 available. This fraction tends to 1 as π 1 tends to infinity. Thus there is a π 1 high enough so that households in country 1 will prefer to accept currency 1. Similarly for country 2.
It is interesting to note that the reverse national currencies equilibrium is stable, and does not disappear with high money growth.
Conclusion
This paper studies a model in which sellers can choose the currency they accept. I show that once some assumptions are made to eliminate indeterminacy of equilibrium, the only stable equilibria have familiar features: all sellers in the same country will accept the same currency.
They might accept the same currency as sellers in the foreign country, in which case it is a single currency equilibrium, or they might accept a different currency, in which case it is a national currencies equilibrium.
The model predicts that a national currencies equilibrium might fail to exist if the stock of a currency grows too fast. This can be interpreted as currency substitution. I also show that currency substitution is more likely to occur if home country biases are not too large or, under another interpretation, if countries are more open to trade. Thus, as economic ties between countries grow, we should expect monetary authorities to have less flexibility in choosing high rates of growth for their currencies. For the same reasons, we should expect more countries to choose a single currency, as in Europe.
